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THE ACCESS TO JUSTICE BILL AND HUMAN
RIGHTS ACT OF 1998: BRITAIN'S LEGISLATIVE
OVERHAUL LEAVES THE SYSTEM
SCRAMBLING TO MEND THE SAFETY NET
Margot Penfold Schoenborn*
To no one will we sell, to no one will we refuse or delay,
right or justice.'
I. INTRODUCTION
Britain's acknowledgement of legal rights for indigents spans cen-
turies, a tenet that formally operated much earlier in Britain than in most
nations. Subsidized legal services manifested itself early in British history,
first appearing in the Magna Carta of 1512. The right to counsel was later
guaranteed by King Henry VII, who decreed: "The Justices... shall assign
to the same poor person or persons counsel learned, by their discretion,
which shall give their counsel, nothing taking for the same;... and likewise
the Justices shall appoint attorney and attorneys for the same poor person or
persons. .. 2 From these words a very powerful and complex system of
legal aid evolved to advance court access for the lower classes.3 Civil legal
rights to counsel, however, are a much more recent and unique attribute of
British legal aid, first funded by the solicitors' professional organization in
* J.D. 2000, State University of New York at Buffalo; B.A. cum laude 1997,
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I CHARLES K. ROWLEY, THE RIGHT TO JUSTICE: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF
LEGAL SERVICES IN THE UNITED STATES at 3 (1991) (quoting the Magna Carta,
1215); EARL JOHNSON, JR., JUSTICE AND REFORM. THE FORMATIVE YEARS OF THE
OEO LEGAL SERVICES PROGRAM 3 (1974) (quoting the Magna Carta, 1215).
2 ROWLEY supra note 1 (quoting King Henry VII 1495 Statute).
3 See id. at 3.
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1948. 4 In 1985 civil legal aid was brought under the state control, where it
has remained ever since. 5
Subsidized legal aid is rooted in the principal of equal justice.
Equal justice is a part of a moral framework that purports publicly-spon-
sored attorneys must act if equal justice is to be honored. 6
An affirmation of unequal access to the law would nullify the moral
claim of any constitutional provision, statute, administrative regulation, or
judicial decision. As an empirical matter, not just as a contention of philos-
ophy, the value of equal access is an essential element of the commonsense
understanding of a legal system, just as are the virtues of a general, public,
intelligible, and consistent reasoning. 7 The British system has long encom-
passed the ideal that all people should be treated equally before the law and
afforded the same rights to access regardless of wealth8 by providing both
criminal and civil counsel to indigents.
A decade of legal reform is transforming the British legal profes-
sion, and in particular, legal aid.9 These reforms, including the latest ratifi-
cation of the Human Rights Act of 1998,10 (hereinafter Rights Act)
dramatically impact the legal aid system, the practice of poverty law, and
the civil remedies available to British citizens. The stated overall objective
of Britain's first set of legal reforms, encapsulated in the Green Paper", was
to ensure the public an expedient network of legal services at an affordable
price.12 Parliament's 1989 Green Paper sought to maintain competent legal
standards and integrity while ensuring that practitioners had the aptitude
necessary to offer reliable services.13 However, there was an overwhelming
4 See Michael Burrage, Mrs. Thatcher Against the 'Little Republics': Ideology,
Precedents, and Reactions, in LAWYERS AND THE RISE OF WESTERN PO-
LITICAL LIBERALISM 125, at 137 (Terence Halliday & Lucien Karpick eds.,
1997).
5 See id.
6 See id. at 3.
7 JACK KATz, POOR PEOPLE'S LAWYERS IN TRANSmON 1 (1982).
8 MARK KESSLER, LEGAL SERVICES FOR THE POOR: A COMPARATIVE AND CON-
TEMPORARY ANALYSIS OF INTERORGANIZATION POLITICS 2 (1987).
9 THE WORK AND ORGANIZATION OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION, 1989, CM. No.
570. [hereinafter MGP].
10 HUMAN RIGHTS ACT 1998 §22 (9 Nov. 1998). This Act, which enforces the
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), is projected to come into full
force in late 2000 or 2001.
11 See MGP supra note 9.
12 See id. at 1-2.
13 See id.
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public outcry opposing the Green Paper's radical recommendations, includ-
ing a complete reconstruction of the split profession. In response, Parlia-
ment drafted and adopted a compromised version of these
recommendations: Legal Services: A Framework for the Future, commonly
referred to as the White Paper of 1989.14
Although the British legal aid system has long been one of the
world's most progressive legal aid schemes, government overspending and
the exclusion of medium-income groups from accessing counsel and
courts'5 jeopardized it. The White Paper's legal aid reforms created a de-
mand-led system that, while inclusive of and beneficial to the legal needs of
the poor, broke the legal aid bank and failed the lower-middle class.
The newly enacted Access to Justice Act 199916 (hereinafter Justice
Act) seeks to repair the White Paper's shortcomings by redefining legal aid
services and fees. The Justice Act creates stringent stipulations on legal aid
practitioners, re-vamps the legal fee structure and narrows the scope of legal
services for indigents. Concurrently, the Human Rights Act, among other
things, provides greater remedies and court access to citizens with civil
rights claims. This note seeks to project the impact of these Acts on legal
aid services and funding for the poor.
The international standard for legal aid is meager. While the Uni-
versal Declaration of Human Rights' 7 (hereinafter UDHR) provides for
rights to a criminal defense' 8 it circumvents the issue of whether the right to
an "effective remedy"19 requires civil legal assistance. Likewise, the Euro-
pean standard for legal assistance under the European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR)20 asserts
14 See LEGAL SERVICES: A FRAMEWORK FOR THE FurURE 1989, CM. No. 740
[hereinafter White Paper].
1 Lord Mischon argued for research on legal aid prior to reformation, and com-
mented on the economic and social back-lashes of the system failing to reach the
middle class: "[W]e still find a gap in our justice system. It is still too expensive
for people in the medium income group." Hearing on Legal Aid Reform Before
Parliament (December 9, 1997 6:10 p.m.).
16 See Lord Chancellor, Access to Justice with Conditional Fees (March 1998)
(visited May 11, 1999) <http://www.open.gov.uk/lcd/consultleg-aid/lacon.htm>.
17 See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted 10 Dec. 1948, G.A. Res.
217A (III), U.N. GAOR, 3' Sess., U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948) (hereinafter UDHR).
18 See id. at art. 10-11.
19 Id. at art. 8.
20 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, opened for signature 4 Nov. 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, Europ. T.S. No. 5
(entered into force 3 Sept. 1953) (hereinafter ECHR).
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the right to free legal counsel for criminal defendants "when the interests of
justice so require. '21 The ECHR provides no express provision for civil
rights to counsel, however, except to require a "fair and public hearing" for
civil rights matters. 22 British courts, however, have construed government
obligations to provide counsel and court access much more narrowly than
the European Court's ubiquitous ECHR interpretations.
The impetus of Britain's recent legal aid reforms was to reconfigure
legal fees and narrow the scope of subsidized aid to reduce towering legal
aid costs. However, the Justice Act's reforms have the potential to create
significant conflict in combination with the Human Rights Act of 1998.
The Human Rights Act is expected to come into force in late 2000 or early
2001. Many of the civil liberties postulated by the ECHR will be incorpo-
rated into domestic law through the Rights Act such as the right to life,
privacy, and a fair trial. 23 Of the utmost concern is whether the legal aid
restructuring initiated by the Access to Justice Act of 1999 works contra to
the privileges guaranteed under the Human Rights Act. Before examining
these issues, one must first understand how the legal aid system functioned
prior to the Access to Justice Act of 1999 and the Human Rights Act of
1998.
II. THE BRITISH LEGAL AID STRUCTURE PRIOR TO REFORM
One of the oldest law systems in the world,24 the British legal prac-
tice is divided between two groups of professionals, each carrying different
duties: barristers and solicitors.25 The distinctions between the two profes-
sions dictate how the system functions and the types of services available to
the public. Solicitors are general practitioners who interact directly with
clients and draft all documents necessary for litigation.26 Barristers, on the
other hand, are litigators who try cases before the courts upon being hired
21 See id. at art. 6(3)(c).
22 See id. art. 6.
23 See Dan Bindman, The Right to Redress, 95 LAW SOCIETY's GAZETTE 20
(1998).
24 See RONALD WALKER & RICHARD WARD, THE ENGLISH LEGAL SYSTEM, 7TH
EDITION (1994); see also Hon. Sir Robert Megarry, Barristers and Judges in En-
gland Today, 51 FORDHAM L. REv. 387, 388 (1992).
25 See Megarry supra note 24, at 390.
26 See Audra Albright, Comment: Could This Be The Last Gasp? England's First
Case Against the British Tabacco Industry, 11 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L. J. 363, 366
(1997).
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by solicitors; they cannot be directly retained by clients. 27 Solicitors may
form partnerships and often compose firms, yet barristers must remain sole
practitioners. 28 Traditionally, solicitors hired barristers to litigate their
cases before all courts. Although solicitors may now try cases in some
courts, they are limited mostly to administrative or arbitration hearings.
29
Barristers practice law in "chambers," which are located in one of the four
Inns of Court,30 to which barristers must belong.31 Consequently, for a case
to be tried, both the solicitors' work product and the barristers' analysis and
oral advocacy are needed. Realistically, to litigate a matter, a client must
pay two fees: one to the solicitors' practice and another to the barrister. Not
only does the split profession multiply a client's legal fees, it forces the
client to pay a barrister to analyze work already expensed by her solicitor.
Britain offers govemment-funded legal assistance to indigents for
both criminal and civil matters. Legal advice and assistance on civil mat-
ters became obtainable to British citizens under the Legal Aid Act of
1988.32 Applicants seeking more than preliminary advice on civil matters
had to pass the Legal Aid Board's "means/merits" test.33 This test, the
Green Form Scheme, 34 examined both the applicants' incomes and the mer-
its of their actions before permitting them aid above a certain amount.35
The "merits" portion of this test was highly subjective because all cases
were considered on an individual basis, and there were no set standards for
what types of actions were worthy of public aid monies.
In 1979, 72 percent of the British citizens were eligible for govern-
ment-subsidized legal aid.36 This percentage compares to 20 percent of
United States citizens who were eligible that year.37 Costs for subsidized
27 See id. Barristers may not solicit their own clients, but instead rely upon solici-
tors who seek their services, as solicitors are not permitted to try cases before all
courts. See id.
28 See id.; see generally, Megarry supra note 24.
29 See Megarry supra note 24; see generally P.W.D. REDMOND & I.N. STEVENS,
GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF ENGLISH LAW, (6'l ed. 1990).
30 See Albright supra note 26, at n.43.
31 See id.; see also Megarry supra note 24, at 390.
32 See generally LEGAL AID ACT OF 1988 (Eng.).
33 See A.K.P. KIRALFY, THE ENGLISH LEGAL SYSTEM, 284, 368 (8' ed. 1990).
34 The name was derived from the government-generated green forms that solici-
tors filled out to seek reimbursement for legal aid work. See id. at 286.
35 See id.
36 See Albright, supra note 26, at 367.
37 See id.
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aid grew dramatically from the 1980s into the 1990s. 38 While Britain's le-
gal aid annual budget floated around £28 million in the 80s, the actual costs
to the British government greatly exceeded that number.39 In England and
Wales, the inflated numbers resulted from annual legal aid expenses that
rose from £682 million in 1990 to £1.5 billion in 1997. 40 This marked
increase in legal aid spending took an egregious toll on the British
government.
Despite the rapid ascension of legal aid costs, the service reached
fewer and fewer citizens. From 1990 to 1997 the average increase in aid
costs surpassed the national inflation rate, yet the number of people receiv-
ing aid (in civil and matrimonial law) dropped. 4 Solicitors were accused of
exploiting fees by pursuing clients' claims they would not think prudent to
finance from their own resources.42
But there is nothing new in this: it has been known for
years that professional advisors, naturally and properly anx-
ious for their clients to be compensated, are inclined to be
more sanguine about the prospects when failure means a
loss of a potential benefit rather than the suffering of a sub-
stantial actual loss. Partly it has stemmed from recognition
of an unfairness inherent in the existing system: a privately
funded defendant facing a legally-aided plaintiff has a
choice between paying his own costs if he wins and both
parties' costs if he loses; so he has an obvious incentive to
pay the plaintiff something, however unmeritorious the
claim, simply to restrict his losses.43
38 See id.
39 See Albright, supra note 26 at n.65.
40 See David Capper, Reforming the System - Part 1, 148 NEW L. J. 1402 (1998)
(quoting Lord Chancellor's speech to the Bar of Northern Ireland Conference on
Feb. 21, 1998); see also Darryl Greer, The Legal Aid Gravy Train, 149 NEW L.J.
221 (1999).
41 See Lord Chancellor, supra note 16; see also Lord Chancellor, Law Society
Speech at Cardiff (Oct. 18, 1997) <http://www.open.gov.uk/lcd/consult/leg-aid/
lacon.htm>.
42 See RT Hon., Lord Bingham of Cornhill, Lord Chief Justice of England, The
Barnett Lecture 18, 11 (June 11, 1998) (visited May 11, 1999) <http://
www.open.gov.uk/lcd/judicial/speeches/barnett.htm>.
43 See id.
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Thus, the nature of Britain's "loser-pays-all" system arguably encouraged
subsidized plaintiffs to pursue imprudent claims, counter to the spirit of the
system.
In 1993 the British government responded to ballooning legal aid
costs by initiating a major budget cut4of £43 million, which disqualified 12
to 14 million previously eligible citizens from subsidized legal services. 45
This response to a legal aid system that the government could no longer
afford, resulted in limiting access to legal services to the very poor who still
qualified for aid and the very rich with the means to pay solicitors' fees. 46
Those in between were excluded.
Currently, one half of Britain's lower and middle class citizens do
not qualify for any type of government-subsidized aid.47 Referred to as the
Middle-Income-Not-Eligible-for-Legal-Aid (hereinafter MINELAS), 48 they
fight an uphill battle in gaining access to the courts because they cannot
afford to pay solicitors' hourly rates. Consequently, MINELAS are more
often than not denied access to the courts, regardless of the merit of their
claim.
A. Parliamentary Reform Aimed at Fixing the Crumbling System
Due to ever-rising costs, the government conducted studies in the
late 1990s to assess the state the legal-aid system. 49 There were three major
weaknesses discovered:
1. rapidly rising costs of the legal aid system and lacking
mechanisms to control growth;
2. inability to target funding toward priority areas; and
3. poor legal-service value for the money. 50
A major problem within the system was that it continued to be "demand-
led,' 5' that is, all who qualified for aid received it, which removed the gov-
ernment's ability to control spending.52 Since the system was demand
44 See Albright supra note 26, at 367.
45 See id.
16 See id.; see also Hearing on Legal Aid Reform Before Parliament, supra note
15, at 6:10 p.m.
17 See Albright supra note 26, at 367-368, (citing Fiona Bawdon, New Brand of
Justice, TIMES LONDON, Oct. 12, 1996).
48 See id.
49 See Lord Chancellor, supra note 16, at para. 3.2.
50 See id.
51 See id. at para. 3.3.
52 See Lord Chancellor, supra note 16, at para. 3.4.
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driven, the government could not direct legal aid funding to support policy
or public interest. 53 Another significant weakness was that there was no
method to assure lawyers' aptitudes to practice poverty law.5 4 Since fees
were paid by the government on an hourly basis, not for services rendered
or results achieved, there was little incentive for efficiency. For example, a
seasoned solicitor who spent 20 minutes on a will was compensated for 20
minutes of work, whereas a less experienced solicitor who spent one hour
on the same document was paid for the full hour at the same rate as the
experienced practitioner. Consequently, the civil legal aid system was vul-
nerable to reckless and fraudulent billing practices.
In the last decade, Parliament addressed the growing need for im-
proving the system's efficiency and capacities by supporting new legisla-
tion designed to renovate the system. Reform proposals have varied, from
those seeking to eliminate legal aid for civil matters, to others suggesting
funding only be available to cases with a 75 percent chance of success. 55
Outside influences, such as the United State's contingency fee system, have
slowly been incorporated into the legal aid structure, but are highly criti-
cized in Britain as promoting bad lawyering.56 Desperate to cut the impos-
ing costs of legal aid to the Crown, Parliament sought out changes that
would control costs while still permitting deserving applicants to utilize the
system. In response, both the Access to Justice Act 199957 and the Human
Rights Act of 199858 were approved by Parliament.
III. THE HUMAN RIGHTS ACT AND THE ACCESS TO JUSTICE BILL
MARKEDLY IMPACT LEGAL AID SERVICES
The Human Rights Act was received by Royal Assent on Novem-
ber 8, 1998, and will come into full force in late 2000 or early 2001. Al-
though Britain has been a party to the ECHR since 1951, violations of the
treaty were not enforceable domestically but by claimants petitioning the
53 See id. at para. 3.5.
54 See id. at para. 3.9.
55 Lord Campbell of Alloway refuted the 75% success rate proposed by the Lord
Chancellor. See Hearing on Legal Aid Reform Before Parliament (December 9,
1997, 5:1 lp.m.).
56 Lord Taveme criticized the contingent fee system as having a "corrupting ef-
fect"and creating conflicts between attorneys and their clients by not providing
incentives "to put their clients or the interests of justice first." Id. at 6:25 p.m.
57 See Lord Chancellor, supra note 16.
58 See HUMAN RIGHTS ACT, 1998 supra note 10. Although the HUMAN RIGHTS
ACT enacts the civil and political rights under the ECHR, the effects it has on the
legal system are thought to be far reaching. See supra note 23.
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European Court in Strasbourg, both timely and expensive endeavors.5 9
Consequently, the Rights Act does not create any new rights but extends
remedies to domestic courts that were previously unavailable by allowing
citizens to pursue human rights claims in British courts.6 This Rights Act,
which formally incorporates provisions of the ECHR into British domestic
law, requires changes in the government's perspective of legal aid funding
and how the courts view legal rights, in general. 61 The purpose behind the
Rights Act is "a wider agenda: to create a human rights culture." 62 It is
hoped that the "public will develop a new perception of themselves as the
confident possessors of inviolable fundamental rights, protected by the
courts against any encroachment under whatever authority. 63
This Rights Act substantially broadens the scope of remedies for
use by local courts and tribunals. Prior to the commencement of the Rights
Act, parliamentary or government acts could not be overturned by the judi-
ciary unless they were deemed "irrational". 64 Once this Rights Act comes
into force, however, the courts will be able to address government acts that
violate the ECHR by ordering injunctions, quashing unlawful decisions, and
awarding damages.65 Consequently, the judiciary will have both more
power to address government wrongs and more remedies with which to fix
them. In order to prepare for the Rights Act's far-reaching changes, the
government allotted £4.5 million to be spent on training the judiciary. 66
This Rights Act, once in full force, will be regulated in tandem with the
Access to Justice Act 1999.
At the end of November 1998, the Access to Justice Act 1999
(hereinafter Justice Act) was presented to Parliament,67 and subsequently
enacted. This Justice Act completes the transition from "a demand-led sys-
tem of public legal funding to one in which the lawyers are contracted to
59 Geoffrey Bindman, et al., Recognising Rights - a look at the progress of the
Human Rights Bill and analysis of the impact of the government's rushed terrorism
legislation, 95 L. SOCIETY GAZETrE 22 (1998).
60 See id.
61 See Bindman, supra note 23 (quoting John Wadham). John Wadham is the
president of Liberty, a human rights NGO. See id.
62 See id.
63 See id.
64 See Lawyers and Human Rights, 148 NEW L. J. 1667 (1998).
65 See id.
66 See Stephen Grosz, The Right to Redress, 95 L. SOCIETY GAZETrE 20, 27
(1998).
67 See Dan Bindman, Justice Bill will herald revolution- mixed reception for legal
reforms, 95 L. SOCIETY'S GUARDIAN GAZETTE NO.44, 1 (1998).
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provide services within a tightly controlled budget." 68  The thrust of the
myriad of changes instituted by the Justice Act is to permit the government
to remove money and damage claims from within the scope of legal aid.6 9
The Justice Act also creates a new commission to administer public funds
for civil and criminal work by replacing the Legal Aid Board7" with the
Legal Services Commission (hereinafter LSC).71 The Justice Act essen-
tially reorganizes the British legal aid system by redistributing allocated
public monies through various agencies, rather than the Legal Aid Board
holding the entire purse. The LSC will oversee both the Criminal Defense
Service, which contracts criminal defenders, and the Community Legal Ser-
vice, which will manage civil legal aid.72
A. The Modified Fee Structure Relies on Conditional Arrangements
Instead of Subsidized Aid
The Community Legal Service will be responsible for working di-
rectly with the not-for-profit sector and funding civil contracts with solici-
tors. 73 The existing "merits test" for determining the merits of a legal aid
case will be replaced by a "funding assessment." 74 The funding assessment
standard, intended to be more flexible that the existing test, will determine
whether cases should be mediated or placed with a conditional fee arrange-
ment.75 Similar to the merits test, the funding assessment weighs whether a
"reasonable person" would fund the action from her own pocket.76 The
LSC will have the authority to create a central fund to supplement high cost
and public interest cases, even though it is assured that a majority of legal
aid cases will qualify based upon the new merits test.77 The new test differs
from the old by determining the forum that best suits the dispute, for in-
68 See id.
69 See Lord Chancellor, supra note 16, at para. 3.11.
70 The Legal Aid Board was created under the Act of 1988 to administer the na-
tional legal aid system, and did so until the Access to Justice Act 1999. See RED-
MOND & STEVENS, supra note 29; see also THE LEGAL AID AcT OF 1988 (Eng.).
71 Dan Bindman, Legal Aid to go for most PI cases, 95 L. SociETY's GUARDIAN
GAZE=rr no.46, 1 (1998).
72 See Bindman, supra note 67.
73 See Bindman, supra note 71.
74 See Bindman, supra note 67.
75 See id.
76 See id.
77 See LEGAL AID RULES <http://www.open.gov.uk/lab/legal3 l.htm> (visited May
11, 1999); see also Modernising Justice White Paper, Dec. 4, 1998 1, 1 (visited
may 11, 1999) <http://www.pfk.com/uk/insolvency/news/19981204.html>.
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stance, whether a matter would be better handled through mediation or
under a conditional fee arrangement. The old test did not have that
capability.
The new "funding assessment" regulation is not without criticism,
however. The new merits test is criticized for being "vague and lacking in
specific focus. ' 78 Critics suggest that the funding assessment should weigh
various factors in granting legal aid, such as the prospects of success or
failure, and the amount of damages to be recovered versus the amount of
costs out at risk.79 The inclusion of such elements might make the funding
assessment more qualitative. Taken at face value, the funding assessment
standard differs very little from the merits test, since both rely on a subjec-
tive "reasonable person" gauge. The only apparent distinction is that the
funding assessment will explore alternative resolution options, such as me-
diation and conditional fees arrangements.
The most controversial reform implemented by the Justice Act is
conditional fee arrangements for certain types of claims. The conditional
fee arrangement (hereinafter CFA) system legislated by the Justice Act is
not an original idea, however, since it was first introduced by Parliament in
1995.80 Prior to the initial CFA 1995 legislation, an individual paid solici-
tor up-front for her expenses, either through legal aid money or private
means. Contingency fees have slowly been introduced, and the Justice Act
greatly expands their role. There were three models of contingent fees pro-
posed originally by the 1989 Green Papers: (1) a win-lose approach, simi-
lar to the U.S. system, where the attorney is compensated if successful; (2)
speculative action, under which the solicitor agrees to charge her normal fee
only if case is won (as in the Scottish system); or (3) that the attorney could
charge some reasonable mark-up to her normal fee upon winning. 81
The preliminary Conditional Fee Law, based on the third fee model
above, was first passed in 1995.82 However, this fee method did not apply
to all civil matters, only personal injury, bankruptcy, and cases coming
before the European Court of Justice.83 The fee law was passed because of
legitimate concerns that the MILENAS, people with average or below-aver-
age means, desperately needed an outlet for accessing the court system with
78 See David Capper, Reforming the System - Part 2, 148 NEW L. J. 1447 (1998).
79 See id.
80 See Albright supra note 26, at 371.
81 See Contingency Fees, 1989, CM. No. 571.
82 See CONDITIONAL FEE AGREEMENTS ORDER, 1995 (Eng.). This act passed by a
narrow margin of 105 for and 100 opposed. See Albright, supra note 26, at 372.
83 See Albright supra note 26, at 367-368, (citing Fiona Bawdon, New Brand of
Justice, TimEs LONDON, Oct. 12, 1996).
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meritorious claims. The adoption of the conditional fee in 1995 was a mon-
umental change to the British legal system.84 It was illegal, up until this
1995 reform, for a solicitor to offer legal services on a contingency fee
basis.85 In 1998, conditional fee arrangements were statutorily expanded to
all civil matters, except family law issues. 86
The British conditional fee differs slightly from the United States',
where a U.S. attorney simply takes a percentage of the client's court award.
The British CFA has two components: the solicitor's hourly fee, and an
"uplift" or supplemental fee.8 7 The uplift is a percentage of the solicitor's
hourly rate, not a percentage of the plaintiffs winnings. 88 The aim in per-
mitting the uplift is to reward the solicitor for taking on a risky case, and to
compensate her for out-of-pocket disbursements associated with litigating
the matter. The uplift can be as much as double the solicitor's hourly, but
the total costs cannot typically exceed twenty-five percent of the client's
judgment. 89 While the mechanics of conditional fees differ from the United
States' contingency fees, they offer similar financial incentives for legal
counsel.
Nonetheless the CFA, like the U.S. contingency fee system, also
encourages court access to middle income individuals who would otherwise
not be able to pay lawyers' fees. Substantial disparity, however, exists be-
tween the magnitude of contingency fees on either side of the Atlantic, with
more modest rewards in Britain.
The Justice Act arranges for the government to eventually move all
money and damage claims from traditional legal aid funding to CFAs. 90
This will become possible once the market for CFAs and insurance policies
84 See id. at 371.
85 See id.; see also Michael Zander, No Win, No Fee, No Clarity, N.Y. TIMES
LONDON, Jun. 6, 1995.
86 See Nicole Murray, The new contingensies - with the erosion of legal aid, the
focus is on conditional fees as never before, L. SOCIETY'S GAZETtE 26, Feb. 17,
1999 (citing statutory agreement 1998 no. 1860); see also Lord Chancellor, supra
note 16, at para. 2.7.
87 See Albright supra note 26, at 373. This is similar to the Scottish legal sys-
tem's conditional fee, where an "uplift" is permitted to accompany a lawyer's fee
where the lawyer's client has prevailed.
88 See id.
89 See id.
90 See RT Hon., Lord Bingham of Cornhill, Lord Chief Justice of England, supra
note 42. Insurance companies are offering a range of products to covers legal ex-
penses taken on conditional fee arrangements.
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for legal expenses more fully develop and gain popularity.91 The response
to the Access to Justice Act, not surprisingly, has been mixed. 92 The British
Law Society is skeptical that the new arrangements will provide indigents
with quality services and greater local access, primarily because of the
CFAs and the franchising requirements for legal aid firms, to be discussed
infra.93
1. The Limitations of CFAs Currently Outweigh the Foreseeable
Benefits
Conditional fees have not been well-received by British legal soci-
ety and legislators because they are thought to promote "ambulance chas-
ing."'94 Some critics predict CFAs will lead to calamities such as, "fewer
people being able to pursue justifiable claims, more injustice to individual
defendants unable to defend litigation, practitioners becoming commercial
speculators: bankers first and lawyers second and succumbing to all the
vices of American-style litigation practices. '95
The distrust associated with conditional fee arrangements stems
from the philosophy that possessing a financial interest in the outcome of
the case will promote solicitors to act unscrupulously. 96 A conflict of inter-
est can rise between a lawyer and her clients where,
[1]awyers' advice about settlement might be influenced all
too readily by their need to be paid rather than the strict
merits of any settlement offer... The benefits of providing
greater access to justice to clients who then have to hand
over a large portion of their damages to their lawyers are a
little more than dubious.97
Another problem with CFAs is that they cannot be used to defend actions.
Consequently, a defendant lacking a counterclaim has to pay her attorney's
fee out-of-pocket if victorious. 98 Critics of the Justice Act see this new fee
system as magnifying previously existing inequity: that lower income peo-
91 See id.
92 See Bindman, supra note 67.
93 See id.
94 See Lord Mischon, supra note 15, at 6:25 p.m.
95 Benedict Bimberg, Community Legal Service, 147 NEW L.J. 1703 (1997).
96 See Albright, supra note 26, at 371.
97 See Bindman, supra note 23, at 20.
98 See id.
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pie could not get civil defense legal aid nor afford private defense counsel
because the loser must pay both parties' lawyers' fees.
While CFAs will inhibit frivolous claims, they also discourage so-
licitors from pursuing meritorious actions that would result in damages less
than both parties' potential legal bills. Although conditional fees may en-
courage plaintiffs who fall in the legal aid gap to seek redress, the "loser-
pays" rule remains a troublesome barrier to most plaintiffs because lawyers
are less willing to accept conditional fees in lieu of legal aid money.99 A
plaintiff (and solicitor, for that matter) will want to make sure that her case
is more than likely to prevail before she litigates her action because of the
"loser pays" rule.1°° Consequently, where a claim is not an obvious winner
and where fees could be extensive but recoveries minor, lawyers will hesi-
tate to act under a conditional fee arrangement. 101 "Lower income people
with reasonable but less-than-certain cases will find it difficult to employ a
lawyer."102 Hence, some claimants may be unable to pursue their claims
simply because their right to legal aid has been abolished and their claim is
too monetarily insignificant to litigate.103
Prior to the Act, personal injury matters could be pursued with legal
aid money. Critics contend that by removing personal injury cases from
within the scope of legal aid funding, claims will not be brought because
conditional fees will be under-utilized by British firms. 1°4 Analysts claim
that the Justice Act has the potential to compromise important human rights
issues, because such matters will no longer qualify for legal aid monies
because of the personal injury classification. 10 5 Moreover, court-ordered
awards are traditionally low and could "discourage the use of conditional
fees in complex human rights cases."'1 6 Consequently, the British Law So-
ciety is concerned that CFAs might give rise to "rationing by the back
door."' 1 7 Before the recent reforms, indigents with meritorious personal in-
jury matters were virtually guaranteed counsel through subsidized aid.
99 Alan Tunkel, The Practitioner - Conditional Fees, 148 NEW L.J. 88 n.6824
(1998).
100 See Albright, supra note 26, at 375.
101 See id.
102 Sir George Young, Where we stand on the Access to Justice Bill, Fact sheet,
(visited Apr. 24, 2000) <http://www/siregeorgeyoung.org.uk/faq/news58.htm>.
103 See Albright, supra note 26, at 375.
104 See Bindman, supra note 23.
105 See id. (quoting civil liberties specialist, Louise Christian).
106 Id. at 20.
107 See supra note 64. The Law Society questions whether the new merits test and
contracting arrangement will give indigents less choice and access. See id.
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Under CFAs, there are no guarantees claimants will secure counsel because
solicitors do not have to extend CFAs.
Many of the larger law firms promptly developed procedures for
handling conditional fee arrangements. 10 8 Risk assessment is the method
by which most firms evaluate their potential CFA matters, with intent to
minimize the risk of losses while maximizing court-awarded damages.
Some firms focus on other factors besides risk, including rewards and re-
sources.' °9 "If the case doesn't involve much work or money, then to a
certain extent the risk doesn't matter much."' 10 Smaller firms have a disad-
vantage, however, when it comes to the resources needed to take on CFAs
due to limited cashflows.'1 ' Small firms lacking the financial capacity to
take on complex and high-risk matters under CFAs affirm analysts' conten-
tion that CFAs will be discouraged by solicitors and will remain an alterna-
tive unavailable to most.
In addition to barriers to CFAs becoming mainstream, CFAs might
fail their purpose due to other impracticalities, such as capped success fees
and insurance carriers' hesitance in underwriting CFA products. The Law
Society supports limiting success fees, the set fee paid to a firm if victorious
under a CFA, up to 25 percent of the damages. 112 This suggested cap is
often downgraded by firms uncomfortable with taking such large portions
of their clients' damages.1 3 Meanwhile, solicitors' fear that success fees
are insufficient to cover the costs of trying complex litigation, especially
because damages are traditionally meager. Solicitors' skepticism toward
CFAs will impact their availability and the standards by which they assess
cases.
The regulations set by insurance carriers will also steer the CFA
market. The insurance industry is carefully launching contingent-based
products to cover solicitors' costs. Premiums are paid to such carriers to
cover the defendant's legal costs if defeated and products are even being
offered to cover plaintiffs' costs where solicitors are reluctant to adopt a
CFA. 4 Carriers quickly learned, however, that some areas of law are
108 See Murray, supra note 86.
lO9 See id.
110 See id. (citing Kerry Underwood of Underwood's firm).
"I See Murray, supra note 86.
112 See id.
113 See id.
114 See Tom Blass, How the Insurance Industry is Responding to the Increasing
Demand for Contingency-Related Cover, LAW SocIETY's GAZEi-rE 26, Feb. 17,
1999.
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much more difficult to assess for risk than others. 15 Fees are a new terri-
tory to be explored by the insurance industry, which must now appraise the
legal aid issues and lawyers' skills. Carriers' predisposition towards CFAs
in various legal areas will lead the market for CFAs by molding policies for
contingency coverage based on specific underwriting standards. Inevitably,
these standards will likely become the guidelines adopted by firms in ap-
praising whether to offer CFAs to their clients.
There are two strong arguments supporting the Justice Act's expan-
sion of CFAs. 116 First, CFAs provide solicitors with greater incentives to
do the most efficient work possible for their clients." 7 Whereas lawyers
have little incentive to act at their maximum professional capacity when
they are guaranteed legal aid payments, attorneys with a financial interest in
the outcome are more likely to perform at optimum levels. It follows that
the more meritorious the claim and the greater the stakes, the more bang a
client will get for her buck.
Second, conditional fees provide court access to litigants who nor-
mally fall outside the range of legal aid qualifications, such as the
MILENAS." 8 Consequently, CFAs grant opportunities to people who can-
not afford the risk of funding their own case to pursue merit-based claims.
This offers litigation opportunities that were formerly out of MILENAS'
financial reach. By permitting the middle class to commence actions on a
CFA basis, the gap in access to justice is narrowed. Consequently, CFAs
enable legal services to reach more people, particularly those previously
unable to pursue claims due to legal costs.
While holding great promise for improving the MILENAS' access
to counsel and maximizing lawyers' professional efficiency, CFAs must
overcome numerous hurdles before these advantages are realized. Since the
Justice Act replaces legal aid funding with CFAs, the public cannot get
subsidized aid in lieu of CFAs. Since CFAs are capped and court-awards
are low, solicitors will not profit much more from these arrangements than
they would under legal aid or their normal fees. Therefore, solicitors do not
have great financial incentives in CFAs. Caps and minimal verdicts are
major drawbacks that will slow the adoption of CFAs.
Until the Access to Justice Act can successfully popularize condi-
tional fee arrangements, sectors of the population will not profit from the
access CFAs can provide. These obstacles are further complicated by the
court access provisions under the Human Rights Act. When enforced in
115 See id.
116 See Bindman, supra note 23.
M1 See id.
118 See id.
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conjunction with the Access to Justice Act, the Rights Act creates more
stringent requirements for rights to legal advice and assistance.
2. The Right to Court Access Under the Human Rights Act Interplays
with the Legal Aid Structure and CFAs
Pertinent to legal aid reform is Article 6 of the Human Rights Act
which provides for access to courts in civil cases as well as the right to a
fair trial. 19 This Article implies an "equality of arms" between parties, that
is, that neither party have a substantial advantage over their opponent. 20
This provision in the Human Rights Act mirrors Article 6 of the European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
(ECHR). Both the Rights Act and the ECHR provide that "[in determina-
tion of his civil rights and obligations... everyone is entitled to a fair and
public hearing within a reasonable amount of time by an independent and
impartial tribunal established by law."'121 Although Article 6 does not ex-
pressly provide for mandatory court access or free counsel, the provision
under Article 6(1) has been construed as incorporating court access into the
"fair trial" entitlement by the European Court. The European Court of
Human Rights has implicitly held that the right to a fair hearing includes the
right of access for civil rights claims. 122
The European Court broadly interprets this provision as placing a
duty upon a nation to supply free counsel to citizens pursuing civil rights
matters. The European Court has gone so far as to say that Ireland violated
a citizen's right to court access by failing to provide civil legal aid.123 The
European Court held in Airey v. Ireland that the "obligation to secure an
effective right of access to the courts necessitated positive action on the part
of the State."' 24 It is particularly noteworthy that the European Court ad-
dressed the right to court access in this manner, since the scope of the Con-
vention encompasses civil and political rights, not those considered
119 See HUMAN RIGHTS ACT, 1998, supra note 10, at art.6.
120 See Birnberg, supra note 95; see also John Wadham, Sources of Funding, In-
cluding Legal Aid and Conditional Fees for Claims under the Act 95 L. SOCIETY'S
GAZETTE 20 (1998).
121 See HUMAN RIGHTS ACT, 1998, supra note 10, art.6.(1); see also The European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
art.6(1) (1948).
122 See id.; see also Golder v. United Kingdom.
123 See Lord Mischon, supra note 15 (quoting Airey v. Ireland, 2 EHRR 305
(1980)).
124 See id.
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economic and social. The Court acknowledged this distinction and the ne-
cessity of broadening the scope of Article 6 in the Airey opinion:
Whilst the Convention sets forth what are essential civil
and political rights, many of them have implications of a
social and economic nature... the mere fact than an inter-
pretation may extend into the sphere of social and eco-
nomic rights should not be a decisive factor against such an
interpretation; there is no water-tight division separating
that sphere from the field covered by the Convention. 125
The European Court asserted that the government had an obligation to pro-
vide civil legal aid in cases that were complex in nature, required expert
testimony, or where the suit called for emotional involvement. 26 Thus,
some experts question whether or not Britain's implementation of the con-
ditional fee arrangement in place of legal aid funding violates the right to
court access. 2 7 The Airey decision constitutes a duty to provide legal aid
for civil cases regarding complex procedure, complex law, those tendering
expert witnesses or witness examinations, and those suits of "emotional in-
volvement."' 1 8 These ambiguous elements, however, create a loose stan-
dard for those seeking legal aid. Until the European Court establishes more
definitive parameters for civil legal aid prerequisites, Britain will be left to
implement reforms reflecting its interpretation of the ECHR.
This positive duty to enforce Article 6 requires careful analysis of
legal aid funding. In civil cases, the case must be evaluated from the stand-
point that aid should be granted where an individual could not have a fair
trial without it.129 Central to this standard is the comparison of the re-
sources of both parties. "Where the other party has considerable resources,
where the law or facts are complex or where disparity prevents an unfair
trial, legal aid will need to be granted."'' 30 The European Court offered
guidelines as to when legal aid should be granted: complex proceedings
where the potential sanctions are severe,13 1 where a defendant lacks the
ability to present the case herself, 32 and where an applicant lacks an under-
125 See id. at para. 26.
126 See Lord Mischon, supra note 15, at 43.
127 David O'Sullivan, Legal Aid and Human Rights, 148 NEW L.J. 43 n.6823
(1998).
128 See id.
129 See Bindman, supra note 23.
130 See id. at 20.
131 See Benham v. United Kingdom, 22 EHRR 293 (1996).
132 See id.
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standing of the intricacies of the law in the face of a professional prosecu-
tion team. 33 This is a pretty ambigous measure, since in most actions a
claimant arguably lacks the capabilities and strategic knowledge to re-
present themselves pro se.
The European Court has creates affirmative responsibilities to mon-
itor appointed lawyers' work-product in legal aid cases. In Artico v. Italy,
the Court declared that the mere nomination of a lawyer is not sufficient to
ensure effective legal assistance.' 34 The state must be sure a lawyer fulfills
her obligations to the client, and if the state is aware this duty is not met,
then the state must replace the lawyer or force her to effectively assist the
client. 135 The Court was careful to limit a state's responsibility for lawyers'
malpractice, however. In Kamasinki v. Austria, the European Court deter-
mined that regardless of whether a person is legally aided or privately
funded, the goings on between the person and her counsel runs independent
from any state obligation. 136 Accordingly, while the state has a duty to pro-
vide court access by providing legal aid in certain instances, they are ulti-
mately not responsible for any errors or omissions committed by legal-aid
funded lawyers.
3. CFA's Are Likely Insufficient to Provide Court Access Under the
European Court's Standard
The European Court "makes no distinction between the effective
right of access of individuals with a 75 percent chance of succeeding in
litigation and those with, say, a 51 percent or 65 percent chance of suc-
cess."'137 Consequently, the distinction drawn by the British CFA scheme
might contradict the purpose envisioned by the European Court. Specifi-
cally, should the an individual's right to access rest on her ability to con-
vince a solicitor to take the case on a conditional fee arrangement?
In the case of R. v. Home Secretary, ex parte Leech, the British
court recognized a right of unimpeded access to the courts. 38 More re-
cently, the court declared that relief granted to individuals on income sup-
port which paid their court fees could not be repealed. 139 Although this
133 See Granger v. United Kingdom, 12 EHRR 293 (1990).
13 See 3 EHRR 1 (1980).
135 See id.
136 See 13 EHRR 1.
137 See 13 EHRR 1.
138 See R. v. Home Secretary, ex parte Leech (No. 2) QB 198 (1994).
139 See Bindman, supra note 15 (quoting R. v. Lord Chancellor, ex parte Witham,
2 All ER 779 (1997)).
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ruling declared a provision eliminating such relief as unlawful, the court's
interpretation of the right of access falls short of that of the European
Court. 40 The British courts acknowledge the government's right to regu-
late the payments of legal aid fees.' 41 Therefore, the British judicial system
perceives the right to access as a "negative formulation: it prevents the gov-
ernment (in absence of express statutory authorization) from putting up bar-
riers in the way of the litigant. Indeed, the phraseology in the prior case of
Leech of a right of unimpeded access to a court suggests a negative right, a
'freedom from' -1.142 Alternatively, the European Court of Human Rights
interpreted the right as one requiring state action. 43 Therefore, the ECHR
interprets the right to access as an affirmative right, while Britain views it
as a negative right.
Treaties encompassing civil and political rights, such as the ECHR,
are often perceived as those which enforce legal rights by prohibiting state
interference and are referred to as negative rights. Alternatively, treaties
enforcing economic and social rights are seen as programmatic. That is, the
implementation of social and economic programs by a state requires gov-
ernment action, and is classified as positive rights. Positive and negative
rights are completely intertwined, however. For example, one cannot real-
ize a political right, such as the right to vote, if one cannot exercise a basic
social right, such as one's right to survival. Likewise, one needs political
power in order to be able to defend it. Therefore, it is significant that the
European Court recognized the interdependency of these rights in the Airey
case because it extended a state's duty not to prevent court access to include
providing legal assistance. 144
Although the CFA provisions in the Access to Justice Bill would
not explicitly violate the Human Rights Act Article 6 requirement of the
right to access, there is some potential conflict in enforcing both pieces of
legislation. Before these Acts, all indigents were eligible for legal aid ser-
vices to pursue civil actions. Violations may arise where a case does not
qualify for aid, and is refused by solicitors under a CFA due to potential
costs or complexity. If indigents are denied both legal aid and CFAs for a
merit-based case, then Britain's incorporation of Article 6 under standards
established by the European Court will fail. This probability raises some
administrative problems, as well, because the government cannot force
firms to offer CFAs. Therefore, while the reforms work under a pretense
140 See id.
141 See Bindman, supra note 15.
142 See supra note 7.
143 See id.
144 See id.
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that citizens not qualifying for legal aid services can enter into CFAs with
private solicitors, this preconception is flawed. The government has no es-
tablished method to monitor fee arrangements nor ensure the consistency of
their availability to the public. Consequently, while the adoption of CFAs
does not by itself transgress Article 6, the possibility that indigents no
longer qualifying for subsidized aid will be denied fee arrangements flies in
the face of the Airey decision.
B. Franchising Requirements for Law Firms Greatly Reduced the
Number of Firms Eligible to Offer Legal Aid Services
Another consideration is that the Justice Act limits the numbers of
practitioners in certain areas by requiring solicitors and barristers to be ex-
perienced specialists in order to practice in certain areas, such as medical
malpractice. 145 The Justice Act required that beginning in January 2000
only firms with "clinical negligence franchise" 146 licenses were able to offer
advice and assistance (Green Form) legal aid. 147 The system formerly au-
thorized all licensed solicitors to provide legal aid services under the Green
Form scheme. Prior to the Act, specialization in a particular area of law
was not required for solicitors to practice. Therefore, the new arrangements
seek to deliver the most adept services per legal aid pound from highly
qualified solicitors.
More than 5,000 firms applied to the LAB for legal aid
franchises. 148 This number, however, represents less than half of the firms
currently providing legal aid services. 149 "Although the LAB claims there
is no limit on the legal aid franchises available, it accepts there will be a
reduction in suppliers, as some firms will not apply."'150 It is predicted
many firms will no longer perform legal assistance, either because they did
too little of it to start or because they will not meet the LAB's standards for
franchising.15 ' Many firms provided legal aid services, but legal aid did not
constitute the bulk of their caseload. In fact, the Law Society forecasts that
145 See Steve Orchard, Criminal Negligence Franchises, 148 NEW L.J. 1744
n.6866 (1998).
146 See id.
147 See Alison Clarke, et al., supra note 148, at 22. To obtain a contract, firms
were required to submit a franchise application, pass an audit, and then bid for a
government contract to provide legal aid services in a particular area. See id.
148 See Clarke et al., supra note 147.
149 See id. The number of firms that applied was 5,000, out of over 11,000 offices
conducting legal aid services. See id.
150 See id.
151 See Clarke, et al., supra note 147.
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the number of legal aid firms will drop from 11,000 to 6,000 once the
franchise application process is complete. 5 2 Consequently, as a result of
the Justice Act's legal aid franchising requirement, many legal aid firms'
capacities to provide such services will inadvertently be eliminated. By re-
quiring specialists to practice some areas of litigation, the government will
be shutting off sectors of the market to firms that do not formally qualify,
and in doing so, lower the quality and competitiveness of the franchises. 5 3
The biggest danger of the Justice Act is that quality and standards could
potentially be sacrificed to cost efficiency, and that large franchising firms
may become captive to the government. 54
Only 2,724 firms held legal aid franchises, a number much lower
than the 6,765 who sought franchises on January 31, 1999.155 In order to
qualify as a franchise, firms need to be accepted by a bid panel, submit their
franchise application, pass a preliminary audit, and then bid for a contact.
Firms seeking to practice family, immigration or mental health law are au-
tomatically granted a contract after passing the audit.156 The remainder of
the civil aid system will come under contract beginning next year. 157 Conse-
quently, poor people can longer walk into any firm off the street expecting
to receive advice and legal assistance. Clients seeking legal aid must now
locate a franchise that contracts with the LSC to provide government aid.
Small firms and sole practitioners will be most affected by the
franchising requirements, mainly because they do not have the staff neces-
sary to process new legal aid paperwork and do not meet the financial
threshold required to become a franchise. 158 Vulnerable practitioners who
cannot adapt to the newly-imposed legal aid rules will have few options:
diversifying, merging with contracted franchises, or closing shop. 159 "The
old system whereby solicitors chose where they would practice and what
services they would offer is being swept aside. In the future, we [the LAB]
will show solicitors where there is a market. It will then be up to them to
develop and manage it."' 16 These restrictions on firms' practice develop-
152 See id.
153 See Orchard, supra note 145.
154 See Note, Legal aid contracting; U.S. lessons, 148 NEw L.J. 1702 n.6865
(1998).
155 See supra note 147.
156 See id.
117 See Note, supra note 154.
158 See Clarke, et. al., supra note 147 (quoting Andrew Otterburn, a management
consultant).
159 See Clarke et al., supra note 147.
160 See id. (quoting Mr. Orchard, LAB Chief Executive).
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ment and areas of expertise demand immediate restructuring and flexible
management, things most small firms lack.
The criticisms of both conditional fee arrangements and franchising
requirements run counter to the purposes driving these reforms. The Justice
Act seeks to ensure that the poor pay as much as they can afford for legal
services, reduce frivolous claims, encourage efficiency in administrative
processes, and minimize the extent to which legal aid puts other litigants in
less favorable financial positions. 161 The Justice Act also seeks to have le-
gal aid services provided by better-qualified and financially solvent solici-
tors and firms. Ironically, legitimate concerns regarding the Access to
Justice Act are that it will fall short in efficiency, quality, and integrity.
Both franchising requirements and the risk associated with CFAs will sig-
nificantly impede access to counsel short-term. Franchising reduced the
number of legal aid lawyers eligible to provide aid, and the conversion of
legal aid funding to CFAs disqualifies people from obtaining free legal
counsel. As a result, there are fewer lawyers to provide indigents with ser-
vices, and those no longer capable of receiving aid must find lawyers will-
ing to extend CFAs for them.
C. The Right to a Jury Trial
Another right guaranteed by the Human Rights Act, the right to a
jury trial, is being hotly debated by the Government and Bar. A proposal
suggesting that criminal defendants no longer have the right to elect a jury
trial surfaced in 1997, and again in 1998, prior to the enactment of the
Rights Act.1 62 The proposal, which endorses denying criminal defendants
the right to choose a jury trail, particularly if they have prior convictions, 163
was set forth in a consultation paper by the Home Office in October of
1998.164 The paper rationalized this reform in the interests of diminishing
expense and in the administration of criminal justice. 165 The option to elect
a jury trial has been referred to by supporters of the consultation paper as
permitting defendants to manipulate the system.' 66 The opposition to the
1997 reform proposal was so great that it was dismissed; 167 likewise, the
161 See Lord Chancellor, supra note 41, at para. 3.7.
162 See Heather Hallet, Human Rights and the Bar, 148 NEw L.J. 1453 n.6858
(1998).
163 See id.
164 See id.
165 See Hallet, supra note 162.
166 See id.
167 See id. at 1453.
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opposition to the 1998 consultation paper was overwhelming. The Bar
Council, the Law Society, and the Legal Action Group are all vehemently
opposed to eliminating a defendant's right to choose a jury trial. 168 There-
fore, by all appearances the legal community accepts the jury trial as a fun-
damental right, but it is unclear whether such unanimous support is
powerful enough to prevent the installation of the reform.
It is important to note that defendants were not always permitted
jury trials. Until the Administration of Justice Act of 1885, "cases were
either triable summarily or on indictment."'169 Relatively speaking, trials by
juries are a modern procedure, and have never been a guaranteed right in
Britain. Now that the Human Rights Act has been passed, however, a re-
form eliminating a defendant's right to elect a jury trial might be in viola-
tion of Article 6, which provides criminal defendants with the "right to a
fair trial." If a defendant can show that she is prejudiced by being denied
the election of a jury, then she would have an action under Article 6 of the
Rights Act.
The right to a jury trial is pivotal to a defendant's ability to receive
a fair trial. The Home Office stated in its consultation paper "that it is
concerned not with the merits of jury trial, but only with the defendant's
ability to choose it."'170 It is easy, then, to see why the legal community is
up in arms over this proposal because the right to a defense and a fair trial
run to the very political and civil rights embraced by the human rights
movement and the domestication of the ECHR through the Human Rights
Act. Hence,
[flew would deny that a jury trial is superior to a trial
before the magistrates and that there is a greater chance of
seeing justice done at the Crown Court than at the magis-
trates' court, if only because greater time, trouble and
money are spent on jury trials. In any case, therefore,
where the State decides to charge a defendant with an alle-
gation of dishonesty or an offence of similar gravity, the
defendant must have the right to choose trial by jury. 17 1
168 See Hallet, supra note 162.
169 See id. at 1453.
170 Id. (quoting the Home Secretary's intent in his proposal to eliminate defend-
ants' rights to elect a jury).
171 Hallet, supra note 162.
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IV. PROPOSALS FOR SUCCESSFUL DUAL-ENFORCEMENT OF THESE
REFORMS
The enactment of the Human Rights Act calls into question whether
the new Legal Services Commission possesses an affirmative duty to pro-
mote and enforce Article 6 provisions, since conflicts between the Justice
Act and Rights Act are bound to arise. 172 In other words, the Legal Services
Commission may have the duty to notify and educate people how to assert
their rights under the Rights Act in order to be remain in compliance with
Article 6.173 There is no provision in the Rights Act creating a Human
Rights Commission, nor for educating the public about its rights or offering
advice for human rights claims. 74 One interpretation of the domestic duties
created by the Rights Act suggests that solicitors will have to notify clients
of their rights, including mentioning the rules on inferences being made
from witness' silence contained in the Rights Act. 175 Since there is not a
separate commission to enforce the Rights Act and assist people seeking to
assert their rights under the Rights Act, that burden then falls upon the Le-
gal Services Commission. This creates a difficult scenario, however, be-
cause the Legal Services Commission also has the duty to enforce
provisions under the Justice Act. The discord in permitting one commis-
sion to manage both acts is apparent: promoting court access while simulta-
neously looking to minimize legal aid expenditures.
It behooves the Crown to establish a Human Rights Commission to
monitor the Rights Act, and keep apprised of domestic and European Court
decisions that define and will set the standards under which the Rights Act
operates. Since the Rights Act provides domestic remedies for ECHR pro-
visions, issues of legal rights and related government responsibilities will
crop up quickly. Since the Rights Act is not yet in full force, the time is
right for the Crown to implement a Human Rights Commission. Not only
would a Human Rights Commission be imperative to eliminating inherent
funding conflicts between the Access to Justice Bill and the Rights Act, but
it would be an excellent way to further the Rights Act's aim. Without a
Human Rights Commission, there is no effective way for the public to as-
sert its rights under the Act. 176 It is up to solicitors to make arguments or
172 See supra note 66 at 20.
173 See Wadham, supra note 120.
174 See id.
175 See Wadham supra note 120 (quoting Paul McGee, Legal Officer at the Cam-
paign for the Administration of Justice).
176 Geoffrey Bindman & Stephen Grosz, The Human Rights Act 1998: Recent De-
velopments, 95 L. SOCIETY GAZETrE 20 (Dec. 10, 1998).
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claims under the Act before local courts, a capability that remains un-
perfected and lacking for many because so few have experience trying
claims before the European Court. Since, for most solicitors, human rights
issues are not an area of expertise, meritorious human rights actions might
be overlooked. A commission could establish funding for human rights
cases and educate the public.
The Crown should also produce a method by which it can regulate
CFAs. A hotline hosted through the Legal Services Commission, for exam-
ple, could refer callers unable to obtain a CFA to another firm or legal aid
franchise. This would be a low-cost safeguard to guarantee that persons
with civil rights claims are able to obtain court access either through CFAs
or subsidized assistance. A "civil rights legal-need" hotline would mini-
mize the new fee structures' chances of clashing with both the European
and British Courts' interpretations of court access. Such a precaution could
satisfy Britain's duty under the ECHR, and now perhaps the Rights Act, to
provide access to legal counsel to persons pursuing civil rights petitions.
Another way to keep CFAs in check would be to have firms report
to the LSC whenever a CFA is used as a payment method. This form could
include pertinent data such as the claimant's damage award, the uplift
amount and the nature of the suit. Statistical information would help the
LSC assess what areas of law and what amounts of fees with what regular-
ity are coming under CFAs. Once sufficient data is gathered, the LSC
could modify or issue further guidelines on CFAs. This data could also be
compared with statistics of prior cases that fell under former legal aid
policies.
The LSC could also mandate firms accept CFAs for all civil rights
claims. Since firms would be forced to take on risk in these instances, the
LSC could pay the insurance premium for a CFA product for that matter.
Or the LSC could require that all firms using CFAs purchase CFA insur-
ance coverage. That way, all firms would be covered for risk-based finan-
cial losses and risk nothing in accepting CFAs. A less costly alternative
might be for the LSC to require lawyers to call the LSC if a client wishes to
bring a civil rights claim under a conditional arrangement, and the firm will
not extend one. The LSC could then refer the client to a different firm or
ascertain whether the client might qualify for government legal assistance.
The new franchising requirements will reduce the numbers of law-
yers able to provide legal aid services. Small firms and solo practitioners
are directly affected by the Justice Act's franchising requirement. While
the requirements are necessary and will serve to enhance the quality of the
counsel provided to indigents, there are fewer lawyers to supply such ser-
vices. The LSC must manage changes including: the caseload of
franchises, the numbers of indigents the LSC refers to franchises, the nature
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of the complaints subsidized by legal aid, and the success of legal aid litiga-
tion. The LSC should be able to determine from the amount of caseload
turnover, the number of suits handled, the cost per claim, and the number of
indigents without active representation whether the current number of
franchises is sufficient. The LSC should also look to geographic
demographics, to curb shortfalls in rural legal aid franchises. If suddenly
there is a dramatic drop in rural legal aid clients, the LSC might have to
reexamine and loosen its franchising requirements to provide opportunities
for small firms to contract for legal aid funding.
It is crucial that the Crown not deny citizens of their right to a jury
trial. Article 6 of the Human Rights Act, once in full force, will lend a
cause of action to a criminal defendant that is denied a jury trial under the
"right to a fair trial" provision. 177 Although the ECHR and the Rights Act
do not contain explicit provisions mandating the right to a jury trial, this
right could implicitly be construed to fall under the "right to a fair trial"
provision. 178 If a law is passed removing the right to a jury, the Crown is
risking precedented standards for jury trials set by the courts.
V. CONCLUSION
The foreseeable problems with the implementation of the Human
Rights Act lie in intrinsic conflicts between the Rights Act and the Access
to Justice Act 1999. The Access to Justice Act 1999 creates reforms that
are desperately needed by the inefficient and high-cost system, and does so
by narrowing the spectrum of legal aid. The Justice Act achieves this by
converting legal aid fees into conditional fee arrangements and shifting fees
from the Crown onto clients. The Rights Act, on the other hand, effectively
broadens the scope of legal rights to British citizens. This problem is com-
plicated further by the fact that Britain has failed to create a Human Rights
Commission. Essentially, the Legal Service Commission will have to as-
sume the responsibility of enforcing both Acts, which will be anything but
easy. The Legal Services Commission must compel compliance with the
Access to Justice Act, while balancing the assertive duties imposed by the
Rights Act in providing court access and rights to counsel. One commis-
sion cannot effectively endorse access to legal services while simultane-
ously controlling the legal aid purse. The government was short-sighted in
not recognizing the complications that will arise from the LSC enforcing
both Acts.
177 See generally HUMAN RIGHTS ACT, 1998, supra note 10, Article 6(1).
178 See id.
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CFAs, if monitored properly by the government, can satisfy the
Crown's duty under the ECHR and Rights Act. What remains problematic,
nonetheless, is that CFAs and alternative dispute resolution are not yet ac-
cepted by the mainstream legal profession. The negative ethical stigma that
is attached to CFAs and the monetary risk involved for relatively little re-
ward are stumbling blocks to the legal profession embracing these arrange-
ments. Since solicitors were guaranteed payment for so long through legal
aid funding, it will be a difficult transition, professionally, for lawyers to
take on the risks involved with conditional fees. The government needs to
recognize that the move from legal aid funding to CFAs displaces not only
fees, but shifts risk and responsibility onto solicitors and clients.
These court access concerns are magnified by the strict nature of
the franchising requirements under the Justice Act. Although franchising
will inevitably improve the quality of legal assistance, the number of firms
that can offer subsidized assistance is deficient. Few small or medium-
sized firms have the financial resources and personnel necessary to be ap-
proved under the new legal aid contracting specifications. Although the
LSC provides a reference list of legal aid solicitors on its website, 79 this is
not a practical means for indigents to access referrals, especially if indigents
do not know where to get help in the first place. The government needs to
quickly resolve these shortcomings so that the objectives of both Acts might
be realized in congruence.
It is crucial that the government not only establish a Human Rights
Commission to manage the plethora of issues raised by the Rights Act, but
also extend opportunities to the legal community to become educated in
alternative dispute resolution and conditional fee arrangements. The sooner
CFAs become the norm, the sooner more classes of people will gain court
access. It is also important that people are educated as to the remedies
available domestically under the ECHR. Although the enactment of the
Rights Act demonstrates Britain's dedication to human rights, it needs to
take the steps necessary to create an effective procedure by which the public
can assert these rights domestically. The Human Rights Act has remarkable
potential to create a human rights culture in Britain by embracing the aspi-
rations of the ECHR. The government has indeed taken a large step in
furthering human rights by enacting this legislation, but it needs to follow
through in overseeing that these rights become accessible domestically.
The Access to Justice Act 1999 eventually will make lawyers and
the courts available to people to whom they were previously unaffordable.
Although the Justice Act eliminates the bulk of legal aid costs through re-
179 See Legal Services Commission website, (visited Apr. 21, 2000) <http://
www.legalservices.gov.uk>.
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classification into CFAs and mediation, people will not gain greater access
to justice until these alternatives become prevalent. Once CFAs become
more conventional, the public will attain substantial benefits. In the
meantime, fears that court access will be diminished are very real. Domes-
ticating the ECHR is a positive stride, but will provide little short-term ben-
efit to uninformed citizens. The government needs to reassure the public
and the legal community of its commitment to these Acts by instituting
formal procedures to regulate and educate both lawyers and the public so
that these Acts may be executed in tandem. Until Britain institutes these
safeguards, citizens needing legal assistance will not be rescued by the legal
aid safety net.

